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The challenges of late development have received scholarly attention for decades.  
As Gerschenkron’s classic study of 19th century Europe argued, ‘backward’ economies 
face distinct opportunities and challenges, including the challenge of competition from 
more advanced economies (Gerschenkron 1962).  In recent years, scholars have 
distinguished between latecomer development and latecomer innovation, and the 
particular challenges that the latter presents have come under scrutiny (Hobday, Rush, 
and Bessant 2004; L. Kim 1997; S.-Y. Kim 2012; Altenburg, Schmitz, and Stamm 2008).  
Simply put, it is one thing to become a ‘fast-follower,’ rapidly adopting the innovations 
of other countries, but quite another to go from fast-follower to innovation leader.   
Despite the growing attention to latecomer innovation, we still lack a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the policy challenges it presents.  In 
addition, it remains unclear to what extent these challenges have changed in recent 
decades.  After all, today’s late innovators face a new international context: “the 
globalization of innovation” (Archibugi and Iammarino 2002; Ernst 2006).  Leading 
firms from developed countries now frequently rely on overseas research and 
development (R&D) centers, as well as R&D alliances with firms from other countries, to 
develop new products.   Developing countries are increasingly involved in these new 
transnational innovation processes.  In 1990, for example, only 17 percent of U.S. R&D 
investment overseas was spent outside of Europe and Japan.  By 2012, that figure had 
more than doubled to 35 percent (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014c).  In short, 
the challenge of late innovation – and how it is changing – deserves greater scrutiny. 
To address these questions, this article develops a theoretical framework that 
outlines the basic policy challenges faced by late innovators today.  Simply put, it argues 
	 2	
that the governments of late innovators must not only encourage greater and more 
research-intensive R&D but also limit their role in the supervision of R&D.  The success 
with which late innovators surmount these challenges, in turn, shapes the extent to which 
they emerge as innovation leaders in their own right.  The globalization of innovation has 
not rendered these reform challenges less relevant or important; instead, it has raised the 
stakes for late innovators as they confront them.  Late innovators that reform successfully 
are poised to profit from integration with global networks.  Unsuccessful reformers, in 
contrast, will find such integration more difficult.  The advent of global innovation thus 
has not changed the basic reform challenges that late innovators face.  It does, however, 
offer greater rewards for countries that reform successfully – and new challenges for 
those that do not. 
 The article applies this theoretical framework to explain the recent experiences of 
China and India as late innovators.  It has been popular in recent years to compare these 
two emerging powers as new sites of innovation in the world economy (Fuller 2014; 
Chaudhuri 2012; Dahlman 2010; Altenburg, Schmitz, and Stamm 2008).  Even so, there 
is no consensus on how the two countries are faring (Kennedy 2015).  This article finds 
that China’s progress is more impressive on multiple fronts.  Compared with India, China 
has confronted the basic reform challenges of late innovation more successfully, has more 
impressive innovation outputs, and has integrated into global networks more successfully.  
Even so, China’s approach also has its weaknesses, and these are important obstacles to 
its emergence as an innovation leader. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  The first section outlines a 
theoretical framework for understanding the policy challenges facing late innovators, 
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particularly in an era in which innovation is globalizing.  The second section compares 
how well China and India have confronted these challenges.  The third section shows 
how China and India’s different approaches have produced divergent outcomes in terms 
of innovation outputs, including both scientific publications and patents.  The fourth 
section compares how China and India’s distinct trajectories have positioned them within 
global networks.  The article concludes by summing up the results and suggesting 
avenues for future research. 
 
The Challenge of Latecomer Innovation 
 While late development can be viewed holistically, it is now popular to 
distinguish between distinct stages within this process.  Scholars now distinguish between 
countries that are ‘fast-followers’ and those that are ‘innovators’ (S.-Y. Kim 2012), 
between ‘imitation’ and ‘innovation’ (L. Kim 1997) and between ‘production’ and 
‘innovation’ (Altenburg, Schmitz, and Stamm 2008).  In practice, of course, the dividing 
line between these categories can be rather blurry.  Manufacturing firms in global 
production networks, for example, play a role in engineering new products.  Moreover, 
the scope for innovation can grow as the transition is made from original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM), in which products are produced according to detailed designs, to 
original design manufacturing (ODM), in which only a basic design is provided in 
advance (Hobday 2000, 133–135).  Nonetheless, there is an important distinction to be 
made between economies dominated by OEM and ODM firms on the one hand and 
innovation leaders on the other.  The economies of the latter are led by the original brand 
manufacturers (OBM) that define and market new products.   
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Amsden and Tschang highlight the difference between followers and leaders by 
distinguishing between five different types of R&D (Amsden and Tschang 2003).  
Innovation leaders lead in three types of research: pure science, basic research, and 
applied research.  The first of these seeks to uncover new scientific principles, the second 
pursues knowledge with the intention of creating wholly new products, while the third 
seeks to differentiate new products ‘on paper.’  In contrast, firms in latecomer economies 
focus on two forms of development.  The first is exploratory development, which 
involves engineering a detailed prototype based on applied research.  The second is 
advanced development, which entails generating a prototype for manufacture.  The 
critical challenge for would-be innovation leaders, Amsden and Tschang argue, is 
stimulating their firms to move toward more research-oriented R&D.  This is a multi-
faceted challenge, as they note.  It requires a more long-term perspective.  It increases the 
need for Ph.D.-level researchers.  It involves more emphasis on science and less on 
engineering.   It requires a focus on the creation of intellectual property, as opposed to the 
acquisition of market share.  The scale and expense of R&D increase as well.1 
While there is no “perfect” example of this transition, a comparison of South 
Korea and Brazil’s recent experiences is illuminating.  In many ways, South Korea has 
embraced the challenge outlined above, while Brazil has struggled with it.  It is not 
merely that South Korea devotes more resources to R&D, though this is certainly the 
case.  In 2011, for example, South Korea’s R&D spending culminated several decades of 
rapid growth by surpassing four percent of the country’s GDP, while Brazil’s R&D 
intensity languished around 1.2 percent (UNESCO 2014).  It is also that South Korea’s 
R&D is more research-oriented.  Surveys of R&D typically distinguish between basic 
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research, applied research, and experimental development – a simpler version of the 
typology developed by Amsden and Tschang.  Between 1998 and 2006, South Korea’s 
private sector devoted between 25 and 30 percent of its R&D spending to basic and 
applied research, with the balance shifting toward basic research over time (OECD 2009, 
103).   In contrast, Brazil’s R&D spending tends to be driven by the public sector, and 
(with a few exceptions) the R&D done by firms tends to focus on process innovations 
aimed at lowering production costs (Bound 2008, 77).  This is not surprising, since 
Brazilian firms are constrained by their personnel:  a 2006 study noted that only 26 
percent of Brazil’s scientists worked in the business sector, compared with close to 80 
percent in South Korea and the United States (de Brito Cruz and de Mello 2006, 12).  All 
in all, while South Korea has struggled with some aspects of late innovation, it is clearly 
more successful than Brazil has been. 
How can the governments of latecomer economies promote the transition to 
innovation leadership?  Despite the important contributions that have been made, the 
literature on latecomer innovation has yet to offer a comprehensive framework that 
outlines an answer to this question.  This article argues that there is a particular balance 
that governments must strike as they support national R&D.  To be clear, the following 
discussion is not concerned with how governments can promote late development in 
general, which is a broader question.2  Nor is this discussion concerned with all of the 
potential obstacles to innovation in a given economy.  Instead, the following paragraphs 
highlight the balance that governments of late developers must strike with regard to the 
promotion of R&D if they aspire to innovation leadership. 
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The first priority entails encouraging greater and more research-oriented R&D on 
the part of firms – an ‘R&D take-off’ (J. Gao and Jefferson 2007).  The potential for 
market failures to impede such investments have been appreciated for decades (Arrow 
1962).  In this case, the challenge is not simply encouraging R&D but also encouraging a 
shift in the nature of R&D, as described above.  A number of scholars have shown how 
governments drive this process forward in late developers (Amsden and Tschang 2003, 
564–71; L. Kim 1997, 21–58; Breznitz 2007; Samuels 1994).  The specific measures 
have varied.  Financial incentives to undertake R&D are an obvious tool.  Greater support 
for university research and doctoral training is another measure, particularly given the 
need for more researchers equipped with Ph.D.s.  Measures that encourage firms to 
collaborate in R&D can reduce risks and spread costs.  And whereas weak protection of 
intellectual property can promote technology absorption and diffusion, stronger 
protection is needed to encourage greater investments in R&D.  As a result of these and 
other measures, governments may create more R&D-intensive economies, while also 
encouraging a shift from development to research within national R&D activity.  
While the first shift involves more active government, the second entails less 
active government.  As scholars of late development have argued, the process of 
catching-up often involves greater government intervention in the economy, including 
support for specific sectors and firms (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990).  At the 
technological frontier, however, such interventions can become problematic.  The 
problem is not merely that there is an increased risk that government may back the wrong 
sectors or firms, since ‘picking winners’ is more difficult at the frontier.  It is also that 
strong patron-client ties between government and the performers of R&D can develop, 
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making connections – rather than merit – the key to winning support and denying 
opportunities to more innovative actors (Mahmood and Rufin 2005, 346).  Such patron-
client ties can complicate development in any developing economy, but they are 
particularly pernicious in would-be innovation leaders, since the entry of new and 
disruptive actors is so crucial to innovation (Olson 2008, 62–65; Mokyr 1990, 261; 
Mahmood and Rufin 2005, 346–347).  Successful transitions, therefore, involve a 
retreating state.  Fong provides a case in point by describing the receding role of the 
Japanese government in computer and semiconductor industries (Fong 1998).  Wong 
argues that developmental states in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have retreated in an 
effort to pursue innovation leadership in biotechnology (Wong 2011).  Focusing on 
Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland, Breznitz also argues that the state must be willing to accept a 
less prominent role (Breznitz 2007, 13–15).  Other scholars concur with the notion that 
the interventionist policies appropriate for catch-up become problematic at the frontier 
(Drezner 2001, 19–22; Yeung 2014, 91; Dahlman and Andersson 2000, 41–42).3 
The globalization of innovation has not reduced the salience of these two basic 
reform challenges.  It has, however, created opportunities and dangers for late innovators 
that did not exist before (Ernst 2009).  More specifically, globalization offers rewards for 
late innovators that reform successfully and punishments for those that do not.  Let us 
first consider the former.  Latecomers that reform successfully position themselves to 
profit from global innovation.  Investments in more advanced human capital enable 
learning from multinational corporations, while also mitigating against the danger that 
domestic firms will be deprived of well-educated workers.  Such investments also create 
the potential for domestic workers to make more substantial contributions in 
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multinational innovation networks.  Greater and more research-intensive R&D spending 
by domestic firms also facilitates learning, while creating opportunities for domestic 
workers outside of foreign firms.  Government restraint, meanwhile, helps ensure that 
these investments are as productive as possible, rather than undermined by patron-client 
ties. 
Latecomers that fail to reform, in contrast, are poorly positioned to exploit these 
opportunities.  Instead, they risk succumbing to what Dieter Ernst has called the 
“poisoned chalice” of global innovation (Ernst 2009, 38).  With a more limited supply of 
human capital, and smaller investments by domestic firms, there is less opportunity for 
learning, and the internal brain drain will loom larger as a problem.  More limited human 
capital, along with weak intellectual property protection, also increases likelihood that 
foreign firms will conduct their more valuable R&D tasks elsewhere.  Lastly, an 
interventionist government may compound these problems by reducing the productivity 
of the domestic investments that are made. 
The two possibilities outlined above are ideal-typical, but they are useful as 
analytical tools, and they imply two very different developmental pathways.  Latecomers 
that reform successfully should play growing roles in the production of original and 
valuable research.  More specifically, national R&D in such cases should result in more 
scientific publications, as R&D becomes more science-based, and it should also result in 
more patents, as R&D becomes more focused on intellectual property.  Foreign firms 
may play a role in national R&D in such cases, but not one that eclipses domestic firms.  
In contrast, latecomers that fail to reform will maintain lower profiles in scientific 
publications and patents.  Foreign firms will be less eager to incorporate such countries 
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into their innovation plans, and foreign R&D centers will be more likely to drain talent 
away from domestic firms. 
 
The Governance Transition 
How are China and India managing the two governance challenges associated 
with late innovation?  The following discussion focuses first on efforts to encourage 
science-based R&D and then on efforts to limit the state’s supervision of R&D.  The 
discussion finds that China has outperformed India with regard to the former, but that 
both countries have struggled with the latter, although in different ways.  
 
Encouraging R&D 
Neither China nor India were leading R&D investors at the turn of the century.  In 
purchasing power parity terms, China’s R&D spending was about $30 billion, while India 
was just under $14 billion, compared with more than $300 billion in the United States.  
China’s spending has exploded since then, however, while India’s has increased more 
modestly.  By 2011, China’s R&D spending had reached $183 billion, while India’s was 
slightly more than $32 billion, as shown in Figure 1 below.4  Even if official statistics 
exaggerate China’s R&D spending, it seems clear that China’s total has increased much 
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China’s surging R&D spending reflects not only rapid economic growth, but also 
rising R&D intensity.  In 2000, China devoted 0.9 percent of GDP to R&D (UNESCO 
2014).  By 2011, however, that figure had more than doubled to 1.84 percent – and then 
grew to 1.98 percent in 2012.  In contrast, India devoted 0.74 percent of its GDP to R&D 
in 2000 and 0.81 percent in 2011.   
China’s rising R&D is led by business.  In 2011, nearly 76 percent of China’s 
R&D ($139 billion) was performed by business while another 8 percent ($14.5 billion) 
was performed by universities (UNESCO 2014).  In contrast, the public sector still 
dominates India’s national R&D spending; only 35 percent ($11.4 billion) of the 
country’s R&D was performed by business in 2011, and only four percent ($1.3 billion) 
by universities.  The prominence of Chinese businesses is becoming apparent globally.  
In 2012, China counted 93 companies among the world’s top 2000 R&D spenders, led by 
Huawei (#31), Petrochina (#66), and ZTE (#94), while India only counted 22 firms in the 
mix (European Commission 2013).5  In this respect, China is more in step with trends in 
developed countries, where business has become the primary engine of R&D.  In recent 
years, business has accounted for about 60 percent of R&D spending among OECD 
member countries (OECD 2015). 
In short, China appears to be in the process of an R&D take-off, while India is 
not.  This difference reflects a range of factors.  In China, a range of measures have 
aimed to increase R&D spending and R&D intensity.  There are financial incentives, such 
as tax deductions for R&D expenditures, lower corporate tax rates for ‘high-tech 
enterprises’ (which must meet certain criteria with regard to R&D spending and other 
	 11	
areas to qualify), and other measures (World Trade Organization 2014, 49).  In addition, 
China had also set up 86 university science and technology parks by 2011, a number that 
was targeted to reach 200 by 2015 (Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s 
Republic of China 2011).  Government pressure on enterprises, particularly central state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), has played a role as well (Hu 2014).  Starting in 2007, the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC), which formally owns and oversees China’s largest SOEs, created incentives 
for managers to invest in technology inputs (Naughton 2012, 7).  Predictably, spending 
increased:  from 2006 to 2010, the SASAC firms increased their share of all intramural 
enterprise R&D from 33 percent to 38 percent (Li 2011, 27–28; China State Statistical 
Bureau 2013, 9).  Even so, what the Chinese government calls “domestic private firms” – 
Chinese firms funded only by private individuals – increased their share as well over the 
same period, from 5 percent to 8 percent (China State Statistical Bureau 2011, 36; China 
State Statistical Bureau 2007, 199).6  China’s growing R&D spending, therefore, is not 
only driven by SOEs.  
India’s government has repeatedly stated its hope of raising the country’s R&D 
intensity, but it has not had anything like China’s success.  While this is partly a function 
of India’s lower level of development, there is more to the story here.  In fact, India’s 
R&D intensity has hardly changed since 1990, when the country’s per capita GDP was 
less than a quarter of it what it is today (Brandt and Rawski 2008, 295; IMF 2014; World 
Bank 2015).  Part of the problem is that India’s programs to promote R&D have been 
plagued by a number of problems, which have limited the funds available and their 
availability to smaller enterprises (Krishnan 2010, 109–111).  In addition, India’s R&D 
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tax credit – while generous – has had limited impact because businesses struggle under an 
onerous and hard to predict regulatory environment.  Smaller firms in particular devote 
significant resources to complying with (or avoiding) regulatory burdens, limiting the 
human and financial resources they have for investing in plants, machinery, and R&D 
(Ernst 2014, 43).  Indian industry has also complained that the government does too little 
to inform entrepreneurs of the incentives that are available (Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 2014). 
While China has outpaced India in promoting R&D spending, how do the two 
countries compare in terms of developing human capital and shifting the focus of R&D 
from development to research?  There are some signs of progress in both cases.  Both 
countries are granting more S&E doctorates than ever before.  China’s total increased 
dramatically from 7,766 in 2000 to 31,410 in 2010, while India’s total increased more 
modestly over that period from 5,441 to 12,356 (U.S. National Science Foundation 2014, 
appendix table 2–42; Government of India 2013b).  There is thus a growing supply of 
PhDs for research-intensive R&D in both countries, but China is moving faster in this 
regard.  Both countries are also spending far more on basic and applied research in 
absolute terms than ever before:  $34 billion in China in 2012 and $11 billion in India in 
2009 (UNESCO 2014).  Again, both countries are improving, but China’s development is 
more impressive. 
With regard to promoting more research-intensive R&D, China and India are 
having more difficulty, however.  Since 2000, Japan and South Korea have both typically 
devoted from 30 to 40 percent of national R&D to basic and applied research (UNESCO 
2014).  The figure for the United States is comparable (U.S. National Science Foundation 
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2014, 0–19).  In contrast, China devoted 22 percent of its R&D to basic and applied 
research in 2000, and only 16 percent in 2012 (UNESCO 2014).  The research intensity 
of China’s R&D is thus headed in the wrong direction.  This decline may reflect the fact 
that firms now play a larger role in China’s national R&D spending, and that business 
R&D is often less research-intensive than public or academic R&D.  Even so, business 
looms just as large in national R&D spending in Japan and South Korea, yet these 
countries are clearly more research-intensive.  India’s R&D has become less research-
intensive over time as well.  From 1999 to 2009, the share devoted to basic and applied 
research fell from 46 percent to 38 percent (UNESCO 2014).  Although the overall level 
is comparable to that in Japan and Korea, and considerably higher than that in China, this 
reflects the persistent dominance of government in India’s national R&D spending, rather 
than a commitment on the part of business to conduct research-intensive R&D.  In this 
regard, therefore, both China and India have some work to do. 
 
The Role of the State 
 While investing in R&D is one matter, the direction of that investment is another.  
To make the transition to innovation leadership, the governments of late developers must 
retreat from a dirigiste role in the economy, allowing firms and universities to take the 
lead in defining the research agenda.  This point is relevant in both the Chinese and 
Indian cases.  In both countries, the government was heavily involved in R&D decisions 
for decades following World War II.  In China’s case, the communist system precluded a 
private role in R&D, and the initial focus on nuclear weapons and missile technology left 
little room for other programs in any event.  In the 1980s, China shifted to a more civilian 
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focus, but the state continued to control where investments were made (Feigenbaum 
2003, 164–188).  In India’s case, nuclear and missile technologies also attracted great 
interest initially, but the state remained in control even outside these areas (Kennedy 
2012, 204–205).  The Indian government set up a network of national laboratories under 
the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and these labs were charged 
with developing technologies to reduce the need for technology imports.  This focus on 
import substitution continued into the 1980s.  In both China and India, then, the state was 
highly involved in R&D throughout the Cold War period. 
 In recent decades, both China and India have moved away from the state-led 
model, but both countries have also struggled with this process, albeit in different ways.  
Let us start with China.  China’s rapid shift to a system in which enterprises account for 
most of the country’s rapidly growing R&D spending is striking.  Nonetheless, the state-
led model has not simply been abandoned.  In 2006, China’s State Council released the 
‘National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development 
(2006-2020),’ or MLP, which touted itself as a ‘grand blueprint of science and 
technology development’ for the country until 2020 (State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China 2006).  Leading up to the MLP’s release, prominent Chinese 
economists had cautioned the government about becoming too involved in technological 
choice (Chen and Naughton 2013, 14).  In addition, eminent Chinese scientists called for 
an open funding system based on peer review, warning that otherwise China would ‘get 
half the result with twice the effort’ (Rao, Bai, and Tsou 2004, A12).  In the end, 
however, control of the research agenda remained firmly in the hands of government 
officials.  In fact, the MLP prioritizes eleven ‘key areas’ and eight ‘frontier technologies 
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for support.  The plan also promotes 16 ‘megaprojects’ in particular, which range from 
manned space flights and lunar exploration to genetically modified organisms.7  The 
latter are clearly a legacy of science planning in China (Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon 2006, 
40).  Each of the megaprojects is supervised by a leadership small group, each of which 
includes representatives from multiple ministries (Chen and Naughton 2013, 15–16).  
Funding for the megaprojects has grown quickly.  It was less than US$1 billion in 2008, 
but more than US$8 billion was allocated for 2014 (Qiu 2014; Chen and Naughton 2013, 
17).   
In 2010, the Chinese government unveiled a new plan: the ‘Strategic Emerging 
Industries’ (SEI) initiative.  The initiative targeted seven areas, including next generation 
information technology, bio-technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energy, 
new materials, new energy automobiles, and energy and environmental conservation.  
The SEI was not intended to replace the MLP but to complement it, converting 
technological progress from the megaprojects into concrete commercial outcomes.  In 
addition, the SEI differed from the MLP by envisioning a broader role for government: 
whereas the megaprojects are government-funded, the SEI relies not only on public 
funding but also on more general efforts to create favorable conditions in which the 
emerging industries can grow (Chen and Naughton 2013, 19).  The Chinese government 
even stipulated how rapidly these sectors should develop.  As of 2010, the seven sectors 
accounted for two to four percent of China’s GDP (Naughton 2011, 325).  The circular 
announcing the SEI stated that these sectors would contribute eight percent of China’s 
GDP by 2015 and 15 percent by 2020 (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
2010).  The initiative was subsequently incorporated into China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. 
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The Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang government has shown interventionist tendencies as 
well, despite market-friendly rhetoric.  In 2014, China unveiled a $19 billion investment 
fund to support the development of microchips, which have become a major import item 
for the country (Y. Gao 2015).  The new fund attracted intense interest from Chinese 
companies, but how well they can exploit this opportunity remains to be seen.  In 2015, 
China unveiled yet another grand plan: “Made in China 2025.”  The goal is to modernize 
China’s manufacturing sector by making it more innovative, more environmentally 
friendly, and more focused on quality.  According to the State Council’s official notice, 
the program will be “market-led” and only “government guided” (State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China 2015).  Yet the notice also says that China should 
“vigorously promote breakthroughs in key areas” and proceeds to list 10 such areas.8  The 
notice also includes a timeline for development, with quantitative targets set for 2020 and 
2025.  In short, the Chinese government is still clinging to its role in directing national 
innovation.  Recent descriptions of China as a complex, “multi-driver” system seem 
appropriate (Fu 2015, 388). 
While India has not promulgated grand plans as China has, it has reformed its 
national R&D system more slowly than China has.  Most of the country’s R&D is still 
funded by the government, as noted above, and the majority of this goes to the strategic 
sectors of space, atomic energy, and defense.  To be sure, there have been significant 
reforms.  Reforms to CSIR in the 1980s, coupled with the liberalization of the Indian 
economy in the early 1990s, shifted the focus away from technological self-reliance and 
toward performing cutting-edge R&D that is relevant to industry (World Bank 2007, 64).  
Laboratories became more autonomous and focused on tangible outputs, such as 
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publications and patents, with the National Chemical Laboratory a particular success 
(Krishnan 2010, 121; Kale and Little 2007, 605).  CSIR’s collaboration with industry has 
also been spurred by the New Millennium Indian Leadership Technology Initiative.  This 
scheme, piloted in 2001 and fully introduced in 2003, promotes public-private 
partnerships (PPP) in high-risk technology development, and the program has been 
expanded over time.  India’s public R&D, then, has become more responsive to the 
market. 
India still has far to go in this regard, however.  The government’s 2013 Science, 
Technology, and Innovation policy noted that the ‘rigidity of centrally developed plans 
for investments’ was often at odds with ‘frontline science, technology development and 
innovation’ (Government of India 2013a, 13).  Or as a former chair of India’s Atomic 
Energy Commission has put it more bluntly, “science and technology R&D investments 
in India are predominantly public sector driven with little input from the private sector, 
which seriously needs to change” (Pulakkat 2015).  Indeed, businesses still complain that 
programs at public research institutes are not aligned with the needs of industry.  To 
address the problem, they have called for the institutes to create formal advisory boards 
with representatives from industry, and they have also suggested ways in which the 
Indian government can better promote R&D in the private sector itself (Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 2014, 2).  Scientists, meanwhile, complain 
of excessive bureaucratic control over their research activities, and of crippling and 
seemingly arbitrary funding cuts that can take place mid-year (Pulakkat 2015).  Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi has vowed to improve matters, and his government has begun 
soliciting input for a new S&T policy, “Vision S&T 2020” (Government of India 2014b).  
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It remains to be seen what the new policy will entail, however, and how effectively it will 
be implemented. 
To sum up this discussion of reform as a whole, it is apparent that China and India 
have taken different approaches to the challenge of late innovation.  China has made a 
concerted and impressive effort to increase national R&D intensity, and its R&D system 
has become more market-led as businesses have come to the fore.  Even so, the Chinese 
government has shown a continuing proclivity to direct – or at least to attempt to direct – 
where R&D investments are made.  India, in contrast, has struggled both to increase the 
R&D intensity of its economy and to foster a more market-led system, though it has made 
some progress with regard to the latter.   With these contrasting profiles in mind, let us 
turn to innovation outputs.  
 
Innovation Outputs 
 How do China and India compare in innovation outputs?  The following 
discussion finds that China and India’s performance in these two areas is broadly 
consistent with their R&D governance.  Overall, it finds that China has outpaced India in 
keeping with its much greater investment in R&D.  Yet it also finds that China’s 
performance is constrained by the aspects of its system that remain state-led, which have 
fostered the emergence of problematic patron-client ties.  
 
Scientific Publications 
 Since the turn of the century, China’s share of academic science and engineering 
(S&E) articles has exploded.  In 2001, China’s share of articles in the Thomson Reuters 
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Science Citation Index and Social Science Citation Index was a mere 3.4 percent.   By 
2011, however, it had reached 10.9 percent – second only to the United States.  Most of 
China’s growth has come in the fields of chemistry, which accounted for a quarter of 
China’s S&E articles in 2011, followed by physics, engineering, and biological sciences.  
India’s share of S&E publishing has increased as well, but more modestly: from 1.7 
percent in 2001 to 2.7 percent in 2011 (U.S. National Science Foundation 2014, 5–38).  
 Quantity is not the same thing as quality, of course, when it comes to academic 
publishing.  Even so, it is also apparent that China is making great strides in scientific 
publishing.  Data on highly cited papers are revealing in this regard.  According to 
Thomson Reuters Essential Science Indicators, 13.1 percent of highly cited (i.e., among 
the 1 percent most cited) S&E papers published between 2009 and 2013 included an 
author from China.  That was comparable to the figures for Germany and England, and 
more than double China’s corresponding figure for 2004-2008.  India’s share of highly 
cited papers has risen as well, though only from 1.4 percent to 2.0 percent (see Figure 2 
below). 
 
Insert Figure 2 here	
 
 
Chinese scientists have also emerged as recognizable leaders in specific fields.  
This can be discerned from their growing importance in what Thomson Reuters calls 
‘research fronts’ – specific areas of inquiry (such as the impact of climate change on food 
crops).  In some fronts, Chinese scholars account for a substantial slice of the ‘core 
papers’ – the foundational and most frequently cited papers within the front.  China 
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accounts for 30 core papers in the study of a new class of superconductors, for example, 
with the U.S. accounting for 15 and Germany for seven (King and Pendlebury 2013, 18–
19).  In another front that is relevant to cancer research, Jasmonate biosynthesis and 
signaling, the U.S. leads with 15 core papers, but China boasts the second-highest total 
with eight (King and Pendlebury 2013, 6–7). 
In short, China has outpaced India with regard to S&E publishing in general.  
Nonetheless, serious problems remain in Chinese science.  Some of these, such as 
plagiarism and risk-aversion, reflect government pressure to demonstrate productivity on 
an almost annual basis (Qiu 2014).  Yet the government’s direction of science funding 
has held China back as well.  Some of the smaller grants, such as those from the National 
Natural Science Foundation, are awarded on the basis of merit.  Larger grants associated 
with the MLP’s megaprojects, however, are often awarded on the basis of connections 
with government officials.  As Chinese scientists have described the process, officials in 
funding agencies exercise their influence by appointing committees of experts to develop 
application guidelines each year (Shi and Rao 2010).  These committees are typically 
composed of favored scientists, and they often draw up guidelines that advantage 
scientists or laboratories that have strong connections with the government.  As a result, 
researchers devote an inordinate amount of time and energy to cultivating relationships 
with government officials, and funds are frequently disbursed on the basis of personal 
connections rather than merit.  In this context, it is not surprising that a recent audit has 
disclosed rampant misuse of scientific research funds in China (Qiu 2014).  In short, there 
is clear evidence of problematic patron-client ties in this case – a direct result of the 
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state’s involvement in managing R&D spending.  Notwithstanding China’s great 
progress, then, there is much room for the management of Chinese science to improve. 
 
Patents 
 The explosion of patenting activity in China in recent years has received no little 
attention.  In 2013, China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) received 2.38 
million applications and authorized 1.31 million of these (Xinhua 2014).  Many of 
China’s patent applications are for utility model patents – a category for minor 
innovations in which lower standards are applied.  In 2013, however, China received 
825,000 applications for invention patents – a total that was up more than 26 percent 
from the year before.  In contrast, only 43,674 patent applications were filed in India in 
2012-2013, and 16,061 were granted (Government of India 2014a).  Such stark contrasts 
are part of the reason China and India fare so differently in the Global Innovation Index.  
In 2014, the Index ranked China 29th and India 76th in the world, respectively (Cornell 
University, INSEAD, and WIPO 2014). 
Straightforward comparisons of national patent data are rife with problems, 
however.  This is particularly the case with China, since the quality of its patents remains 
in question.  The Chinese government has offered a range of incentives to boost patent 
applications and patents granted in recent years (Liang 2012, 486).  While this has had 
the desired effect, not all applications are serious, and some are submitted for ideas that 
are not expected to generate economic value (The Economist 2010).  The level of 
scrutiny that patent applications receive is another variable.  One study estimated that 
each patent agent in China spent an average of 2.5 days on each application in 2009 – a 
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remarkably short amount of time and well below the average of 18 days estimated for the 
U.S. (Liang 2012, 510).  Even the state-run China Daily characterizes China’s patent 
boom as ‘high quantity, low quality’ (China Daily 2014).  To gauge national innovation 
activity, therefore, we need more comparable data. 
 One useful approach is to compare countries in terms of triadic patents.  A triadic 
patent family is a set of patents covering the same invention that has been granted by the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent Office (EPO), and 
Japan’s patent office (JPO).  Triadic patents thus reflect uniform, and relatively high, 
standards of evaluation.  In addition, triadic patents generally represent more important 
innovations, because inventors are more likely go to the added trouble and expense of 
pursuing protection in multiple markets if the invention is deemed particularly valuable.  
Figure 3 below shows triadic patent data by inventor’s country of residence for China and 
India between 1999 and 2012.  China’s total has increased rapidly to nearly 1,000 triadic 
patents in 2012.  While this remains well short of the U.S. figure for that year (12,722), 
the trend is impressive.  In contrast, while India’s total has increased, it has done so at a 
much more moderate pace.  Moreover, India’s rate of increase appears to have slowed 
after 2010.  To sum the two trends up differently, China’s total increased by a factor of 








In both China and India, employees of foreign firms account for most of this 
triadic patenting activity (Branstetter, Li, and Veloso 2014).  If we focus on the overseas 
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patenting of Chinese and Indian firms, however, China is still well ahead.  The top 
Chinese firms have not only invested heavily in R&D but also made aggressive efforts to 
protect their intellectual property. Huawei’s prolific patenting is well-known: by the end 
of 2012, the firm had been granted more than 30,000 patents worldwide (Huawei 2014).  
In 2013, the firm applied for 1,149 more patents from USPTO (U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office 2014).  Yet Huawei is not the only Chinese firm seeking patents 
overseas.  In 2013, Tencent, Lenovo, and Alibaba applied for 248, 134, and 88 patents 
from USPTO, respectively.  Overall, Chinese firms have more than twice as many patents 
with USPTO as their Indian counterparts (Branstetter, Li, and Veloso 2014).   
Indeed, India’s top technology firms have not traditionally emphasized creating 
their own intellectual property.  This is most apparent in IT.  Indian IT service providers 
generally offer personnel and expertise to support the R&D of other companies, 
particularly American companies, rather than investing in their own IP.  Wipro’s annual 
report for 2012-2013 disclosed that the firm spent only 0.6 percent of IT services revenue 
on R&D (Wipro 2013).  As of January 2014, however, the company had five to six 
thousand employees in ‘product and engineering services’ – providing software and other 
services to support to new product development for other firms (Srivastava 2014).  It is 
for this reason that the firm describes itself as a global leader in ‘outsourced R&D’ 
(Wipro 2013, 3).  Infosys has traditionally stood out for spending more on R&D than 
other Indian IT firms, but the company now appears to be cutting back.  It devoted 2.5 
percent of revenue to R&D in 2013 but only 2.0 percent in 2014 (Infosys 2014a).  This 
de-emphasizing of R&D is also evident in the downsizing of Infosys Labs, which 
describes itself as ‘defining and driving the research and innovation agenda at Infosys’ 
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(Infosys 2014b).  In 2013, the Labs’ staff was reduced from 600 to between 300 and 350 
personnel in order to increase staffing on billable projects (Subramanian 2014).  India’s 
pharmaceutical companies offer a somewhat different example.  These firms have 
traditionally specialized in generic drugs, rather than wholly novel medicines.  Some are 
now trying to become more creative and to move up the value chain: Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories has established an R&D facility in Princeton, New Jersey with this purpose 
in mind.  Yet this remains a nascent development, and patent applications thus remain 
relatively low as well.  In 2013, Dr. Reddy’s applied for 7 patents from USPTO (U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office 2014). The figures for the Indian firms Ranbaxy and Lupin 
were 11 and 2, respectively.   
Nonetheless, while Chinese firms are ahead of their Indian counterparts in the 
pursuit of intellectual property, problematic patron-client ties bedevil China’s corporate 
innovation system.  In the consortia that conduct megaproject research, for example, 
prominent SOEs have taken a greater role than other types of companies, even though 
these state enterprises are not China’s most innovative firms.  Whereas SASAC firms 
accounted for more than a quarter of national R&D spending in 2010, they accounted for 
only 9 percent of domestic patent applications and only 6 percent of patents received 
(Naughton 2012, 12).  China’s SOEs are also laggards in terms of patenting overseas, 
particularly when compared with firms like Huawei and ZTE, which were founded 
without investment from the central government.  In short, while Chinese megaproject 
largesse gives a privileged role to SOEs, these are not the most innovative firms in the 
Chinese economy, even if foreign firms are excluded.  In this context, it is not surprising 
that more dynamic firms that are involved in the megaprojects, such as Huawei, have 
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complained about the restrictions and stated that they would prefer a more open system 
that allowed more collaboration with foreign firms (Liu and Cheng 2011, 34).  
 
Roles in Global Innovation 
 In a variety of ways, China and India have come to play more prominent roles in 
global innovation in recent years.  As described below, foreign multinationals have 
established a growing number of R&D centers in China and India, while some Chinese 
and Indian companies are collaborating with foreign firms in R&D alliances.  Chinese 
and Indian firms have also begun to invest in overseas R&D centers as well.  These 
developments have not fundamentally changed China and India’s trajectories as late 
innovators, however.  Instead, the success with which China and India have confronted 
the basic policy challenges facing late innovators has shaped the nature of their 
integration into global networks.  Consistent with its more successful reforms, China has 
integrated into more successfully into these networks than India has.  China has attracted 
more interest from foreign firms, it is playing a more important role in global innovation 
overall, and it is less constrained by the internal brain drain challenge.  Even so, China’s 
record is hardly untarnished, as the following discussion will show.  
Let us begin with China and India’s relative prominence in global innovation.  
Despite the nationalistic tone of China’s MLP and SEI initiatives, the Chinese 
government has welcomed collaboration with foreign firms in R&D in recent years 
(Kennedy 2013).  While India also welcomes such collaboration, most estimates indicate 
that China hosts more foreign R&D centers than India does.  One recent study, which 
focused on the 500 multinationals that spend the most on R&D worldwide, found that 
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385 had centers in China while 228 had centers in India (Zinnov 2013).  China is also 
more active than India in terms of concluding transnational R&D alliances.  Between 
2000 and 2014, Chinese organizations concluded 200 such alliances, while their Indian 
counterparts concluded 105 (Thomson Reuters 2015).  If we focus just on more recent 
years (2010-2014), the numbers still favor China, 47 to 18.  
If we focus on the nature of the R&D that multinationals are doing in China and 
India, it is difficult to generalize.  In both countries, there are examples of impressive, 
global-facing R&D efforts.  Microsoft Research Asia in Beijing, for example, does 
world-class research in areas ranging from user interface, multimedia, data intensive 
computing, search, and computer science fundamentals (Lo 2014).  For its part, Cisco 
India represents a major R&D effort featuring 17 of the company’s 84 top engineers as of 
early 2014 (The Economic Times 2014).  In other cases, however, the work is simply 
designed to adapt existing products to local markets.  One prominent global wind power 
firm, for example, re-designed its gearbox in China to make it less expensive, but in 
doing so it cut the durability of the product in half (Anonymous 2013a).  Overall, 
however, recent research suggests that more impressive work is being done in China.  
This research has compared the quality of patents (as measured by forward citations) filed 
with the USPTO by China-based and India-based employees of multinational firms 
(Branstetter, Li, and Veloso 2014, 29).  The results indicate that patents associated with 
Chinese inventors are of higher quality than those associated with Indian inventors.  In 
fact, if one compares patents within the same company, those featuring Chinese inventors 
are equivalent in quality to those produced exclusively by inventors resident in the firm’s 
home country.  There appears to have been rapid improvement in the quality of patents 
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filed by China-based employees of multinationals, but not in the patents filed by India-
based inventors.  
But if foreign firms are doing more work – and more important work – in China 
than in India, China’s more successful promotion of R&D means that Chinese firms are 
better positioned to compete for domestic talent than Indian firms are.  In the past, to be 
sure, Chinese scholars and officials have worried that foreign firms were luring the 
country’s best and brightest away from domestic firms and research institutes (Breznitz 
and Murphree 2011, 106; Schwaag-Serger 2009, 59–60).  These worries have receded in 
recent years as Chinese start-ups have become more prevalent and attractive and as 
salaries at Chinese firms have risen (Anonymous 2013b; Murphy and Lin 2014).  In 
India, in contrast, domestic employers struggle to compete.  Multinational R&D centers 
pay up to 10 times what Indian government labs do, so the foreign companies routinely 
hire the best talent (Ernst 2014, 36).  Indian businesses have difficulty competing in part 
because their R&D budgets are so limited.  In 2011, for example, Indian businesses spent 
only $11.4 billion on R&D, as noted above.  That same year, U.S. firms alone spent $2.1 
billion on R&D activities in India – nearly 20 percent of the Indian total (U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 2014b).  The R&D work in foreign firms, meanwhile, often has little 
relationship with the local Indian economy.  India has impressive chip design capabilities, 
for example, but its talent is contained within foreign firms, which are focused on export 
markets, so little of this capability is disseminated locally (Ernst 2014, 7).   
China is also making a bigger impact in global networks as its technology firms 
invest overseas.  R&D spending by Chinese firms in the U.S., for example, has increased 
rapidly from virtually nothing in 2007 to $366 million in 2011 (U.S. Bureau of Economic 
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Analysis 2014a).  While R&D spending by Indian firms has increased as well, it has done 
so more modestly, from $6 million to $39 million, over the same period.  California in 
particular has been a magnet for Chinese IT companies, with both Huawei and ZTE 
opening R&D centers in the state in recent years (Rosen and Hanemann 2012, 35 and 50).  
While data for Chinese and Indian R&D spending in the EU are not available, Chinese 
FDI in Europe more generally in recent years has outpaced Indian levels, and it is clear 
that China’s investments include R&D centers (Eurostat 2015; Di Minin, Zhang, and 
Gammeltoft 2012).  As of 2013, for example, Huawei’s 16 R&D centers overseas 
included centers in Germany, Sweden, France, and Italy (Huawei 2014). 
While China is integrating more successfully into global innovation networks, its 
track record is hardly unblemished.  There is strong dissatisfaction on the part of many 
foreign businesses with the extent of industrial espionage in China today, which in some 
cases appears to be state-sponsored (Mandiant 2013).  While there are concerns about 
intellectual property protection in India as well, a report published by the U.S. 
intelligence community in 2011 called China and Russia “the most aggressive collectors 
of U.S. economic information and technology” (United States Office of The National 
Counterintelligence Executive 2011, 4).  This concern may be affecting where foreign 
firms invest in R&D.  Prior to 2010, U.S. firms consistently spent more on R&D in China 
than in India.  Since 2010, however, India has taken the lead.  In 2012, for example, U.S. 
firms spent $2.3 billion in India, compared with $2.0 billion in China (U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 2014c).  In terms of specific sectors, India has narrowed the gap with 
China in manufacturing R&D, and it has overtaken China in “professional, scientific, and 
technical services,” a category that includes computer systems design and software 
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development (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014c).  To be sure, there may be 
multiple reasons behind these shifts, and China concluded an agreement with the United 
States in 2015 to address concerns about its industrial espionage.  Even so, serious 
concerns persist, and the extent to which the agreement will reduce them in the future 
remains unclear (Shalal 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that late innovators face two basic policy challenges.  On 
the one hand, they must encourage greater and more research-intensive R&D spending.  
On the other hand, they must limit government supervision of R&D.  The success with 
which late innovators confront these challenges, in turn, shapes their performance in the 
production of original and valuable research.  The globalization of innovation has not 
rendered these challenges less important; on the contrary, it has raised the stakes for late 
innovators as they confront them.  Late innovators that reform successfully are poised to 
profit from global integration, while the unsuccessful will find such integration more 
challenging. 
This theoretical framework illuminates the recent experiences of China and India 
as late innovators.  Overall, China’s reform effort has been more successful.  In 
particular, China has been far more successful at encouraging greater R&D spending, 
particularly among enterprises, and it has generated a greater supply of human capital in 
S&E fields.  Consistent with this difference, China has performed more impressively than 
India in scientific publications and patenting activity.  Generally speaking, China has also 
integrated more productively than India has into global innovation networks.  Yet China 
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has also paid a price for the government’s continuing intervention in the management of 
R&D.  There is evidence of problematic patron-client ties both in scientific research and 
in corporate innovation.  Such problems limit the efficiency with which R&D spending is 
translated into innovation outputs, and this weakness may become more serious in years 
to come, especially if China’s economy continues to cool and resources become more 
constrained.  In addition, the extent of industrial espionage in China in recent years has 
generated considerable alarm among foreign firms, which may limit how prominent the 
country becomes in global innovation in the future.  
These findings speak to other studies that have explored the political economy of 
innovation in China and India in recent years.  With respect to China, this study agrees 
with recent critiques of the government’s nationalistic management of R&D policy 
(Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Naughton 2011).  It also accords with studies that have 
criticized China as preoccupied with increasing inputs to innovation rather than the 
efficiency with which these inputs are used (Deiaco and Jeding 2015; Fu 2015, 350–52).  
It disagrees with the notion that China is mired in ‘technological stagnation,’ however, as 
its most ardent critics have suggested (Beckley 2012, 69).  Instead, this study suggests 
that China has made remarkable progress in some respects, even as it has struggled in 
others.  With respect to India, this study concurs with recent critiques of the 
government’s failure to promote R&D more effectively (Krishnan 2010, 61–140).  It also 
concurs with studies that have contrasted Chinese and Indian corporate business models 
and linked them to national innovation performance (Chaudhuri 2012).  It does not fault 
Indian firms for following less ambitious paths, however, but rather highlights the 
incentives they face and the environment in which they are operating.  The study also 
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challenges the idea that India needs to emulate China’s interventionist approach to R&D 
management.  It is China’s encouragement of R&D in general that India ought to 
emulate, not its micromanagement of where investments are made.  
Future research should explore in more detail the conditions that give rise to 
successful transitions in late innovators.  More research on the role of regime type would 
be particularly welcome.  Is it the case that autocratic or post-communist governments are 
more capable of generating an R&D take-off, but that they also tend to intervene in R&D 
management, as the Chinese case suggests?  Or is this outcome dependent on other 
factors that distinguish China from India?  In addition, more research on how global 
innovation networks promote or constrain development in late innovators is warranted.  
While a number of recent studies have explored the spillover effects of foreign R&D 
centers in China and India, there is no consensus at present as to the net benefits for host 
economies (Fu and Gong 2011; Marin and Sasidharan 2010; Basant and Mani 2012; 
Quan 2010).  This study has argued there is no uniform effect; success and failure depend 
upon the kinds of reforms adopted by the host country.  In that sense, it demonstrates that 
today’s late innovators are not at the mercy of multinationals, but retain an important 





1 Amsden and Tschang note that the first government labs in latecomer economies 
typically focused on basic or applied research and preceded centralized R&D in private 
firms.  Their point is not that such efforts must be revived, since they were typically 
unproductive or focused on defense priorities, but that firms must move beyond a 
preoccupation with forms of R&D that are tightly coupled to manufacturing (Amsden and 
Tschang 2003, 557). 
2 Scholars often note that access to foreign technology is an important ingredient in late 
development and late innovation, for example.  The focus here, however, is on new 
challenges that late developers confront as they seek to become innovation leaders. 
3 One recent study of mobile broadcasting in South Korea (S.-Y. Kim 2012) suggests that 
government may not need to retreat so much as develop more specialized, expert 
agencies that can manage innovation in specific areas.  This solution appears highly 
demanding in terms of government capacity, however, making it difficult to replicate.  
4 Following the practice of the U.S. National Science Foundation, this article relies on 
UNESCO R&D data because it makes spending figures available in constant dollars and 
purchasing power parity terms. 
5 China’s total did not include various Chinese firms incorporated in the Cayman islands, 
such as Tencent (#195) and Baidu (#322).   
6 These data are for large- and medium-sized private firms in particular. 




8 The areas include new information technology, numerical control tools, aerospace 
equipment, high-tech ships, railway equipment, energy conservation, power equipment, 
new materials, medicine and medical devices, and agricultural machinery. 
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